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Abstract
The EU’s energy transition has advanced rapidly over the last decade, with important implications for the policy landscape.
Scholars have characterized the Emissions Trading System (ETS) and the Renewable Energy Directive as themost important
policies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the electricity sector. However, since the early 2010s, non-governmental
and industrial actors have debated whether renewable energy (RE) support and targets are compatible with the ETS. This
article systematically assesses the policy preferences of five groups of non-governmental actors with respect to the role of
the ETS versus RE policies in three policy processes. Formost groups, preferences remain stable across the policy processes.
In the electricity industry group, preferences vary from one policy process to another. During the ETS-reform, this group
of actors argues that the ETS should be the main climate policy, whereas, in the Clean Energy Package-process, almost half
of the utilities endorse continued RE support. This represents a shift in their line of reasoning and policy position: from
asserting that RE policies ‘destroy’ the ETS, towards a position which recognizes the value of having both the ETS and RE
policies as complementary instruments in the policy mix. The findings point to increasing support for RE policies, which is
important for policy makers and scholars involved in designing and implementing the EU’s decarbonization policies.
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1. Introduction
The need for deep reductions in global Greenhouse Gas
(GHG) emissions is urgent and tremendous (IPCC, 2018).
Confronted with recent evidence from climate scientists,
the European Commission (hereafter: Commission) has
called for accelerating decarbonization endeavors in the
EU, targeting climate-neutrality by 2050 (Commission,
2018a). This has major implications for decarbonization
policies in the EU. Given the key role of the electricity sec-
tor for reducing GHG emissions, this article takes a closer
look at two policies that have been characterized as ‘the
key policy’ for decarbonizing the electricity sector by dif-
ferent types of actors: the Emissions Trading System (ETS)
and the Renewable Energy Directive (RED).
Renewable energy (RE) policies and the ETS are
both policies whose ultimate objective is to reduce GHG
emissions. However, these two policies follow differ-
ent logics: the former provides financial support and
market advantages for specific low-carbon technologies,
whereas the latter leaves it to market-mechanisms to de-
cide where emission reductions should take place and
through which technologies they should occur. Since
they co-exist in the European electricity sector, it is im-
portant to study how they work in relation to each other.
Scholars have pointed to the need for analyzing policy in-
struments in theirmix and encourage researchers to take
a policy-mix perspective (Flanagan, Uyarra, & Laranja,
2011; Rogge & Reichardt, 2016).
Since the adoption of the EU’s 2020 Climate and
Energy Package, there has been much debate regard-
ing what the EU’s policy mix should look like. Scholars
have argued that this discussion can be described as a
conflict between different logics in climate policy, i.e.
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whether to pursue a ‘technology-neutrality approach’
or a ‘technology development approach’ (Boasson &
Wettestad, 2013; Fitch-Roy, 2017). These two opposing
perspectives are reflected in different strands of litera-
ture. Economists have argued that carbon pricing is supe-
rior to other policies in terms of cost-efficiency (Fischer
& Newell, 2008) and that this instrument should be able
to work alone without other measures in the policy mix
(Böhringer & Rosendahl, 2010). On the other hand, inno-
vation scholars argue that in order to successfully com-
bat climate change, innovation in all its forms will be
indispensable (Fagerberg, 2017). This includes not only
technological innovation but also new modes of con-
sumption and of organizing social systems. Hence, it is
increasingly recognized that we need a multiplicity of in-
struments to foster transitions (Rogge, Kern, & Howlett,
2017). One important insight from this literature is the
value of creating niches in order to help the uptake of
new and more sustainable technologies. Even though
this might be costly in the beginning, it might trigger
rapid cost reductions as has been experienced with wind
and solar power. The literature on ‘strategic niche man-
agement’ (Kemp, Schot, & Hoogma, 1998) elaborates on
the elements of successful niche building and identifies
market protection as one key factor together with net-
working and learning. The EU’s RE directive from 2009
contains several of these elements through its binding
RE targets on member state (MS) level, RE action plans,
and enabling RE support schemes.
Despite the salient debate on the relationship be-
tween the ETS and RE policies, the policy processes
around these two types of policies have not been suf-
ficiently explored in the literature, with Boasson and
Wettestad (2013) and Fitch-Roy (2017) being noteworthy
exceptions. This article examines the policy preferences
of five groups of non-state actors with respect to the role
of the ETS versus RE policies in recent policy processes. It
systematically assesses the positions of industry, electric-
ity producers, traders, RE associations, and environmen-
tal NGOs (E-NGOs) across three distinct policy processes
through an extensive review of consultation responses
combined with a limited number of in-depth interviews.
It seeks to understand the different strategies taken by
these groups of actors and asks:
RQ: Why do different actors hold substantially dif-
ferent policy preferences towards the ETS and RE
support—and are preferences consistent across pol-
icy processes?
A particular look at the policy preferences of these ac-
tors is highly relevant for analyzing the unfolding tran-
sition in the electricity sector, given that many of them
are intimately involved in—and affected by—the actual
changes. Previous studies have shown how the positions
of particular groups of actors have influenced policy out-
comes through successful lobbying strategies (Gullberg,
2013; Ydersbond, 2014). Since the energy transition is
an ongoing process, it is valuable to capture the policy
preferences at different stages in order to analyze how
the transition affects the involved actors and vice versa.
Moreover, assessing policy preferences helps to identify
main battle lines in the policy process and informs on fea-
sibility for future policy outcomes. In light of ambitious
climate targets and the need for climate action, the anal-
ysis provides useful insights for policymakers and schol-
ars about policy mix designs in advancing transitions.
For most actors, I find that preferences remain stable
across the policy processes. Industry associations favor a
weak ETS and elimination of RE policies. E-NGOs and RE
associations argue that both policies can and should co-
exist in the policy mix. For the electricity industry, pref-
erences vary between processes. During the ETS-reform,
this group advocated that the ETS should be the main cli-
mate policy, whereas, in the policy process around the
Clean Energy Package (CEP), almost half of the actors in
my sample argue that we still need RE support. In other
words, the policy preferences with respect to these two
policies are apparently inconsistent across policy pro-
cesses. I suggest that the main explanation for this can
be found in organizational factors that have resulted in
a shift in business strategy. Confronted with changing le-
gal frameworks, alarming climate science, consumer de-
mands, and higher climate risks, these companies have
responded by increasingly investing in RE. They have
established RE departments and spelled out strategies
for increasing RE deployment. However, along with aug-
mented RE portfolios, they recognize that the ETS might
not be sufficient to enable RE investments and, hence,
shift their preference in favor of continued RE policies.
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 gives
a brief introduction of the ETS and RE policy in the EU
with a focus on recent developments. Section 3 intro-
duces the theoretical perspectives from the policy mix
literature and key expectations based on assumptions
from rational choice institutionalism. Section 4 explains
themethods applied, followed by the results in section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. Policy Mixes and Their Characteristics
Various strands of literature have explored important
aspects of policy mixes from different angles (Edmond-
son, Kern, & Rogge, 2018). In addition to the traditional
study of policy strategies and instruments, recent contri-
butions have highlighted the role of the policy process in
policy mixes (Flanagan et al., 2011). Rogge and Reichardt
(2016) thus propose treating the policy process as a dis-
tinct building block when analyzing policy mixes. They
argue that policy processes cover all stages of the pol-
icy cycle, including “problem identification, agenda set-
ting, policy formulation, legitimization and adoption, im-
plementation, evaluation or assessment, policy adapta-
tion, succession and termination” (p. 1625).
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 1, Pages 105–123 106
The public policy literature has focused on assessing
how different policies, including their policy strategies
and policy instruments, affect each other in a policy mix.
This has been termed policy interaction. Different frame-
works have been developed to assess the success of pol-
icy mixes (Del Río, 2014; Howlett & Rayner, 2007; Rogge
& Reichardt, 2016). These contributions suggest various
assessment criteria for evaluating interactions and iden-
tify consistency and coherence as key characteristics1.
Consistency refers to how well the elements in the mix
work together with respect to achieving the policy objec-
tives. It incorporates both the absence of conflict as well
as synergistic effects. Coherence describes how well the
policy processes of different fields are aligned. It can also
refer to the capacity of institutions and policymakers to
implement specific outcomes, which is less relevant for
this article.
Policy interaction in policy mixes takes place on sev-
eral levels. (Flanagan et al., 2011; Rogge & Reichardt,
2016). There can be interaction between policy ele-
ments, i.e. between instruments, between strategies and
instruments or between different policy strategieswithin
the same (or overlapping) policy fields. Another type
of interaction is between policy processes, in which ne-
gotiations or lobby activities in one process influence
the events in parallel processes. One example of this is
what Boasson and Wettestad (2013, p. 37) term ‘bar-
gained interaction’, which summarizes the observation
made by Liberal Intergovernmentalism that policymak-
ers may initiate policy linkages in bargaining situations
in order to enhance their impact during the policy pro-
cesses (Moravcsik, 1998).
For the study of policy interactions between the ETS
and RE policies at the instrument level, economists have
performed econometric analyses to quantify these ef-
fects. Within neoclassical economics, it is a widely held
tenet that RE subsidy schemes have “no effect on to-
tal carbon emissions at all if the electricity industry is
also subject to a cap-and-trade system” (Jarke & Perino,
2017, p. 103). Studies based on theoretical economic
modeling find that such a policy mix can even lead to in-
creased emissions (Böhringer & Rosendahl, 2010). More-
over, the combination of these policies will increase mit-
igation costs (Fankhauser, Hepburn, & Park, 2010). In
order words, the policies are inconsistent. As a result,
economists have recommended to modify the policy de-
sign of the trading scheme so that such negative effects
can be reduced (e.g., Goulder, 2013).
The general perception of the economists contrasts
with the insights derived from innovation studies. Inno-
vation scholars have emphasized the need to help new
and immature technologies. They established the con-
cept of a ‘technological regime’ to explain why it is so dif-
ficult for new actors and technologies to compete with
established actors (Nelson & Winter, 1977). The regime
consists not only of technologies but the whole system
built around it. This is why innovation scholars have em-
phasized the role of niches in protecting and nurturing
new and sustainable technologies (Kemp et al., 1998;
Smith & Raven, 2012). Insights from this literature iden-
tify three processes as crucial for niche development:
learning, network building, and the articulation of expec-
tations (Geels, 2011). Hence, the task of niche manage-
ment is not only to provide financial support but also to
help new technologies overcome the barriers to enter-
ing the market. Since new players meet numerous ob-
stacles when competing with established technologies in
themarket, support for sustainability transitionsmust be
more than simply financial support as new technologies
will require institutional and social change (Kemp, 2011,
p. 16). Innovation scholars have therefore argued that
green energy technologies require specific support poli-
cies (Kemp, 2011, p. 16) and that carbon pricing “should
be seen as a supplement to innovation policy, not an al-
ternative” (Fagerberg, 2017, p. 3). The RED (2009/28/EC)
is a typical example of niche protection, in which the new
technologies are shielded from market exposure. In ad-
dition to national support schemes, it provides produc-
ers of renewable electricity certain advantages (priority
dispatch and free grid connection). However, the inno-
vation literature also argues that support to niche tech-
nologies becomes superfluous as market penetration in-
creases (Hellsmark & Söderholm, 2017; Rogers, 1996).
Therefore, policymakers and researchers should closely
monitor the situation to identify the point at which RE
producers are able to invest in new power plants with-
out support.
2.2. Analyzing Policy Preferences
Building on recent policy mix literature (Lindberg,
Markard, & Andersen, 2018; Rogge & Reichardt, 2016),
this article includes the policy process into the policy
mix analysis and takes a particular look at the policy
preferences of key non-governmental actors. Policy pref-
erences are conceptualized as the positions taken, and
expressed publicly, by actors regarding specific policy
problems. Scharpf (2000) uses the notion ‘actor orien-
tation’ for actor preferences and perceptions, and sug-
gests treating these orientations as a theoretically dis-
tinct category. Different theoretical approaches depart
in their views on what shapes policy preferences. Socio-
logical and historical institutionalism stresses how policy
preferences are socially constructed and shaped by insti-
tutional norms and practices (Berger & Luckmann, 1966;
March & Olsen, 1989).
Policy preferences are neither clear nor stable. They
develop over time. They are shaped not only by forces
exogenous to politics and decision making but also by
1 Del Rio (2014) uses the terms conflicts, complementarities, and synergies, put points out that there is no consensus on these definitions in the literature
on interaction (p. 273). Del Rio also distinguishes between assessment criteria for the policy mix and instrument interaction, although this paper does
not engage with this discussion.
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the processes of politics themselves. (March & Olsen,
1989, p. 146)
The literature on institutional theory distinguishes be-
tween institutional pressure (external drivers) and orga-
nizational factors (internal drivers) for preference and
strategy formation. The former includes market exter-
nal drivers (customer/investor demands and competitive
pressure) and non-market external drivers (regulatory
framework, media and civil society pressure) whereas
the latter are organizational level (firm characteristics
like type and size, internal communication and organiza-
tional inertia) and individual-level psychological drivers
among leaders and individuals within the organization
(Delmas & Toffel, 2008). They have shown that institu-
tional pressure will affect organizations differently, de-
pending on their organizational characteristics such as
ownership structure, trust, and identity. As a result,
scholars have recognized that institutional factors alone
cannot explain the differences between firms regarding
their business and marketing strategy (e.g., Delmas &
Burbano, 2011).
Another possibility for a change in publicly expressed
preferences is that the change does not represent real
action, but a shift in how the actors present themselves
as a part of their market strategies, also called ‘selective
disclosure’ or ‘greenwashing’2. Many of the drivers for
such activity overlap with those listed above (Delmas &
Burbano, 2011).
Rational choice theory, on the other hand, assumes
that actors have stable preferences directed at optimiz-
ing their self-interest and exogenous preference forma-
tion (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Scharpf, 2000). Typically, ra-
tional choice institutionalists start out by assessing the
preferences of actors in order to explain the emergence
of institutions, whereas historical institutionalists focus
on how institutions influence individuals’ behavior (The-
len, 1999, p. 397). In a strong rational choice perspective,
preferences are unrelated to the environment in which
they are generated. Although many economists accept
that this is a weak assumption, they acknowledge that
it enables preferences to be incorporated into econo-
metric models (Guillen-Royo, 2007). Sharp argues that
the methodological advantage of the rational choice ap-
proach for political scientists is that it enables the for-
mulation of working hypotheses based on findings in ex-
isting literature. Assuming that key preferences remain
stable allows us to set up initial expectations about the
population in the sample. This procedure simplifies the
identification of the outliers, which subsequently serves
as the research puzzle (Scharpf, 2000; Thelen, 1999).
Drawing on the assumptions set out in rational
choice theory, I expect actor preferences to be stable
across policy processes which take place in parallel and
over a limited time period. I also expect policy prefer-
ences to align with the positions of the same types of
actors that are documented in the literature. As a result,
my expectation is that industry and electricity producers
will have a strong preference for the ETS and mobilize ar-
guments from the literature on economics, i.e. arguing
that the ETS and RE support is inconsistent and should
not co-exist in the policy mix. I expect that RE industry
and E-NGOs will favor a broad set of policies that should
co-exist with the ETS and give priority tomeasures which
promote technology development, as encouraged by the
innovations studies literature.
2.3. Analytical Framework
The article structurally assesses and compares the policy
preferences of key non-governmental actors in three pol-
icy processes. Figure 1 illustrates that there is policy in-
teraction on all levels of these distinct processes, i.e. be-
tween policy strategies, between instruments, between
strategies and instruments, and between policy prefer-
ences. The scope of this study is the policy preferences
for the ETS and RE policies and the interaction of pref-
erences. My operationalization of policy interaction is
two-fold: First, I assess whether actors perceive policies
as consistent and coherent, second, I assess whether ac-
tors’ preferences are consistent across the respective pol-
icy processes.
The three policy processes are listed in Table 1 and
include the ETS reform, the process preceding the adop-
tion of the 2030 Energy and Climate Framework and the
Clean Energy Package for all Europeans, for which I as-
sess consultation responses for the Renewable Energy
and Electricity Market Directive.
The reason why I include the policy process on the
Electricity Market Directive in C) is because this directive
is highly important for future RE deployment. Along with
increasing shares of RE in the electricity market, market
designs and regulations need to be adjusted. Issues such
as systemoperation, trading rules, and grid development
have major implications for RE, and many of the changes
in the recast directive address these issues. As a result,
most actors express their positions on RE versus the ETS
in the associated consultation responses.
3. EU Climate and RE Policy
Multiple climate policies have co-existed in the EU since
the early 2000s. The ETS and RE policies developed in par-
allel during the 1990s, leading to distinct directiveswhich
regulate the ETS and RE deployment. The directives have
co-existed since the implementation of the ETS in 2005.
The EU has repeatedly referred to the ETS as being the
cornerstone or flagship of its climate policy (Wettestad
& Jevnaker, 2016). However, scholars have argued that
it is RE policies which have been key for driving the en-
2 Selective disclosure is defined byMarquis, Toffel, and Zhou (2016) as a strategy to gain or maintain legitimacy by disproportionately revealing beneficial
performance indicators to obscure their less impressive overall performance. This is similar to the concept of greenwashing, which has been described
as disinformation disseminated by an organization so as to present an environmentally responsible image (Vos, 2009).
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Figure 1. Analytical framework.
Table 1. Policy processes assessed in the article.
1: ETS reform 2: 2030 Energy and 3: Clean Energy Package:
Climate Framework RED
Electricity Market Directive (EMD)
When 2012–2017 2013–2014 2015–2018
Key policy strategies Reduce GHG emissions Targets for 2030: RED: Facilitate and enable RE
and instruments in sectors covered by the 40% GHG emissions deployment Binding national RE targets
scheme (industry and reduction National Renewable Energy Action
electricity production) 27% RE 27% (at least) Plans (NREAPs)
Emissions reduction increase in energy EMD: Ensure affordable, reliable and
targets: efficiency sustainable electricity production in the EU
43% by 2030 (to 2005) Establish internal market for electricity;
21% by 2020 (to 2005) promote/facilitate cross-border trade
ergy transition so far (Cointe & Nadaï, 2018). The follow-
ing sub-sections provide brief overviews of the develop-
ment of the ETS and RE policies until 2018.
3.1. EU-ETS: The Climate Policy Flagship
Climate policy in the EU gainedmomentumafter the sign-
ing of the Kyoto Protocol (KP) in 1997. Following failed at-
tempts to introduce a carbon tax in the early 1990s, the
EU tried to prevent a KP based on flexible mechanisms
(Boasson &Wettestad, 2013). Still, this ended up being a
key feature of the KP, above all due to the US, who made
their acceptance of the KP conditional upon the inclusion
of emissions trading. The Commission revisited the idea
of emission trading and presented its first proposal for an
ETS in 2001 (Commission, 2001). In 2003, the directive
establishing the ETS (2003/87/EC) was adopted. For a re-
view of this process, seeMeckling (2011). The ETSwas or-
ganized into different consecutive periods (phases) that
would allow for a regular revision of the system. As of
2018, it covers energy-intensive industries and large elec-
tricity and heat producers in 31 countries.
Phase I (2005–2007) was a test phase to prepare
for phase II (2008–2012). In these first phases, al-
most all allowances were allocated to the industry for
free (minimum 95% in phase I, decreasing to 90% in
phase II). The economic crisis in 2008–2009 resulted in
decreasing emissions, causing a large surplus in emis-
sions allowances. This was carried over into phase III
(2013–2020), in which 58% of allowances are auctioned.
Even though this was a substantial increase compared to
phase II, the issue of free allocation (to industries fac-
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ing a high risk of carbon leakage or electricity produc-
ers in east-European countries) is contested, as shown
in Section 5.1.
The large surplus and plunging CO2 price spurred
the reform process of the ETS, which led to substantial
changes in the policy. The reforms started with back-
loading of in total 900 million allowances in the period
2014–2016 and the adoption of a Market Stability Re-
serve (MSR) in 2015 (European Parliament and Coun-
cil, 2015). This ensures that backloaded allowances are
transferred to the reserve, instead of being auctioned
in the market in 2019–2020, as initially agreed. The pur-
pose of the MSR is to manage the number of allowances
in circulation at any given time. In 2018, a revised ETS
directive was adopted (Directive (EU) 2018/410) which
doubles the intake of allowances into the MSR, pre-
scribes permanent cancellation of surplus allowances
in 20233, and strengthens the linear reduction factor
from the current 1.74% to 2.2%. For parts of the indus-
try that are less exposed to carbon leakage, free alloca-
tionswill be phased out by 2030 (Commission, 2018b). In
their account of the reform process until 2015, Wettes-
tad and Jevnaker (2016) characterized the ETS reform
as ‘rather successful’. Early summer 2018, the CO2 price
climbed from sustained low levels of around €4–6 to €20
(Montelnews, 2018).
3.2. RE Policy: Targets and Technology Development
The EU started discussions about promoting RE deploy-
ment already in the late 1980s (Boasson & Wettestad,
2013). The first RED (2001/77/EC) was adopted in 2001
(Fouquet & Johansson, 2008). Most importantly, it set
out a joint RE target (minimum 12% by 2010) and in-
dicative targets for renewable electricity (amounting to
21% of gross electricity consumption). A recast RED
(2009/28/EC) was adopted in 2009 after strong nego-
tiations (Skjærseth, Eikeland, Gulbrandsen, & Jevnaker,
2016). Main policy elements was a 20% target for the EU,
binding national targets for all 28 MSs and National RE
Action Plans. This provided the Commission with consid-
erable possibilities to control and redirect national poli-
cies. The RED (2009/28/EC) also made important provi-
sions on the design of support measures, grid rules, and
administrative procedures in relation to RE.
In 2015, the Commission started the work with the
‘Clean Energy Package for all Europeans’, including a re-
cast RED for the period 2021–2030. Adopted in 2018, it
sets out a joint 32% target for 2030, but no binding tar-
gets on MS level. It allows continued financial support
for RE and makes important restrictions on their design4.
The rules regulating dispatch and grid access are moved
to the Electricity Market Directive.
In addition to the RED, the EU regulates renewable
energy support through the Guidelines on State Aid for
Environmental Protection and Energy (SAG). In the guide-
lines for the period 2014–2020, the Commission states
its strategy to phase out renewable energy subsidies be-
tween 2020 and 2030 (Commission, 2014). The official
strategy of the Commission, the European Council, and
the European Parliament is to let the energy market be
the main tool to “allow for the integration and develop-
ment of larger volumes of electricity produced from re-
newable sources” (Commission, 2016).
3.3. Policy Interaction
The EU’s energy and climate policy since 2010 has been
characterized by the question of whether there should
be one single policy (the ETS) with one single target (for
GHG reduction), or whether this should be combined
with distinct policies and targets for RE and energy effi-
ciency. The arguments used in the policy processes co-
incide largely with contrasting theoretical positions de-
scribed above. Fitch-Roy (2017) argues that the overlap
of the 2030 Energy and Climate Framework and the ETS-
reform resulted in a weak RE target, for two reasons.
First, many actors invested considerable resources into
the ETS-process, limiting their capacity to engage whole-
heartedly in the 2030 debate (p. 249). Second, for some
actors, it became logically inconsistent to support RE tar-
gets while making the case that the ETS should be the
primary driver of climate and energy policy (p. 260). The
latter is an example of how policy preferences within
distinct policy processes interact. Interestingly, this in-
teraction between policy preferences is not observed in
the policy processes preceding the ETS and RE directives
adopted in 2009. Boasson and Wettestad (2013) found
that all major European electricity producers strongly fa-
vored a market-based instrument within the RE direc-
tive5, but that they didn’t use the negative interaction be-
tween the RE policies and the ETS as an argument against
the RED.
4. Methods
Key interest actors and organizations were identified by
means of an expert group consisting of seven experts,
who were asked to rank the most influential actors in
EU electricity policy. The ranking was based on a pre-
selection which was made based on which actors had
submitted a consultation response to the consultations
in the CEP-process. The experts were researchers or in-
dustry actors working on or within the field. A few ac-
tors were removed from the sample because they had
not been active in the policy process on the ETS, which
3 “From 2023 allowances held in the reserve above the total number of allowances auctioned during the previous year should no longer be valid”
(recital 23, Directive (EU) 2018/410).
4 “Support schemes…shall incentivize integration of RE sources in the electricity market in a market-based and market-responsive way, avoiding unnec-
essary distortions of electricity markets…and ensure that RE producers are responding to market price signals” (Renewable Energy Directive (2018)
Art 4.1–2).
5 With the exception of Iberdrola.
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attracted amuch larger audience than the electricity sec-
tor. In the end, I chose to add three utilities to the sam-
ple because they were mentioned as being influential
by the interviewees. After sorting the actors according
to the type of actor, I removed actors who were not
part of an appropriate group. I ended up with a list of
30 actors and five groups of actors Table 2. Please note
that I use the current names of actors who changed
their name during the period (Ørsted, WindEurope, and
SolarPowerEurope).
To capture the policy preferences in different policy
processes, I assessed their consultation responses to the
Commission. A list of the consultations assessed for each
policy process is included in the Annex.
To identify and compare the policy preferences, I cre-
ated a coding scheme. I arrived at three main coding
dimensions and several sub-dimensions (Table 3). The
coding questions were developed bottom-up from the
data and were based on insights in the literature in or-
der to identify themain distinctions between actors. The
first coding dimension (D1) captures the policy mix pref-
erence and assesses the actors’ preferences regarding
the ETS as a main climate policy (SD1.1) and RE support
(SD1.2). The second dimension (D2) assesses the prefer-
ence for reforming the ETS, and dimension three (D3)
assesses what I call ‘Renewable Energy Ambition’. The
SD1.1 is assessed twice, initially in the ETS consultations
and subsequently in the CEP-consultations. Values for
SD1.2 and D3 are derived from the CEP, whereas D2 is
based on ETS consultation documents.
The coding of consultation documents was carried
out in Nvivo and Excel. Each consultation document was
coded with specific values for the respective dimension
on a scale from 1 to 4. See Table C in the annex for an ex-
planation of each (sub-)dimension and the correspond-
ing lead questions. In the end, the values from the sub-
dimensions were added together to arrive at one single
actor value for each main dimension.
In order to explore different explanations for my find-
ings, I carried out seven semi-structured interviews with
some of the actors in the sample. The interviews were
carried out in the period November 2017–January 2019.
The list of interviews can be found in the annex (Table A).
One obvious limitation of the study is that it does not in-
clude the positions of governments and EU institutions.
Therefore, the article does not embark on the task of
explaining the policy outcomes that resulted from the
policy processes assessed. A larger number of interviews
would be needed to explore the drivers behind the policy
preferences in greater detail.
5. Results
For most groups of actors, policy preferences remain sta-
ble across the policy processes that were assessed in
this article. This is true for industry associations, renew-
able associations, E-NGOs and electricity traders. These
groups have what I call consistent policy preferences.
This is only partly the case for the electricity indus-
try, where many actors express inconsistent preferences
from one policy process to another. As postulated by ra-
tional choice institutionalism (Section 2.2) these deviant
actors are themost interesting finding of the assessment.
Section 5.2 thus focuses on presenting and explaining
this finding.
Table 2. Key non-state actors in EU electricity policy.
Environmental NGOs CAN, Greenpeace, WWF, E3G
Renewable associations BEE, EREF, WindEurope, SolarPowerEurope
Electricity producers and their associations EDF, Enel, Iberdrola, RWE, Statkraft, Total, Vattenfall, Fortum, E.on, Ørsted,
CEZ, CEDEC, Eurelectric, Foratom, Euroheat and power
Traders Europex, EFET
Industry associations BusinessEurope, CEFIC, IFIEC, Euracoal, Eurochambers
Table 3. Coding dimensions for capturing policy preferences in the consultation processes.
Main dimension Sub-dimensions
D1) Instrument Mix for the Energy Transition SD1.1 The role of the ETS
SD1.2 RE support
D2) ETS Ambition SD2.1 Removal of allowances surplus and tightening of the LRF
SD2.2 Free allocation of CO2 allowances post2020
D3) Renewable Energy Ambition SD3.1 RE deployment
SD3.2 RE potential
SD3.3 RE targets
SD3.4 RE leads to increased system costs
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5.1. Policy Preferences
Figures 2–4 and Table 4 show the findings of the analy-
sis. The E-NGOs and the RE associations hold largely the
same positions across the three policy processes. As a
result, these two groups of actors are merged into a ‘pol-
icy preference group A’. Their preferences are character-
ized by very high RE ambitions, a univocal call for high
and binding targets for RE and GHG emissions reduction
and a strong preference for continued RE support. As
for the ETS, they call for a strengthening of the scheme
through rapid and thorough ETS reform. Moreover, they
do not believe that there is a need for free allocation of
allowances to any actors. Regarding the relationship be-
tween ETS and RE policies, they explicitly argue that the
ETS must be complemented by additional policies:
WWF warns strongly against a carbon market ‘ortho-
doxy’ where the Commission would perpetuate the
notion that the EU ETS can deliver all the needed emis-
sion reductions in a timely manner on its own. No sin-
gle policy instrument can be left alone to achieve this
complex andmulti-faceted task since it cannot correct
all the relevant market failures....In particular, the EU
ETS must be framed as having its rightful place in an
optimal mix of policy instruments in the pre and post
2020 context. (WWF, ETS 2015, 6.2)
ETS alone has not been and will never be capable
of ensuring meaningful reductions of greenhouse gas
emissions. (Solar Power Europe, ETS 2015, 6.4)
These arguments contrast the positions of industry as-
sociations, traders and almost the entire electricity in-
dustry in the ETS process. These three groups insist that
the ETS should be the ‘key’, ‘main’, or ‘only’ climate pol-
icy of the EU. Many actors highlight the detrimental ef-
fect of RE policies on the ETS and the inefficiency of the
current policy mix. Most of the electricity industry and
the traders (merged into ‘policy preference group B’ in
Figure 2) advocate a strengthening of the ETS, with some
variation as to howmuch and how rapid this should hap-
pen. The industry group (C) and RWE do not see a need
to reform the ETS. They argue that the ETS is function-
ing and delivering its objective, i.e. GHG emission reduc-
tions in the sectors covered by the scheme. TOTAL stands
out from all groups with inconsistent preferences in their
ETS-submissions in 2013 and 2015 about whether the
ETS should be themain tool, combinedwith a preference
for not strengthening the scheme.
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Figure 2. Policy preferences as expressed in consultation responses regarding the ETS reform.
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Table 4. Overview of policy preferences for GHG and RE targets in the 2030 Energy and Climate Framework. Sources: Con-
sultation responses 2030 Framework; Ydersbond (2016).
POLICY PROCESS 2: 2030 Framework—Consultation responses 2013
Actor type Policy Actor GHG reduction RE target?
Preference target?
Group
Environmental NGOs CAN 55% At least 45%, binding on national level
WWF 55% At least 45%, binding on national level
Greenpeace 55% At least 45%, binding on national level
A E3G 55% At least 45%, binding on national level
Renewables
associations
EREF 40% At least 45%, binding on national level
SolarPowerEurope 40% At least 45%, binding on national level
EWEA 40% At least 45%, binding on national level
Electricity producers
and their
associations
Eurelectric At least 40% 27%, binding, but not on national level
Foratom 40% no
EDF Single binding no
B Statkraft At least 40% no
CEZ Single binding no
RWE Single binding no
Fortum Single binding no
B/D Ørsted At least 40% Binding target, also on national level
TOTAL Consistent with No fixed target/Indicative target
other major
emitters
CEDEC Legally binding Binding target, also on national level
Vattenfall Single binding no
Iberdrola Single binding no
E.on Single binding no
ENEL Single binding no
Traders B EFET Single binding no
Industry
associations
C (B)
CEFIC Dependent on no
global agreement
IFIEC Dependent on no
global agreement
Euracoal Dependent on no
global agreement
BusinessEurope Dependent on no
global agreement
Eurochambers Single binding, Demand impact assessment of
taking the inconsistencies. Consider relative
outcome of target.
negotiations
into account
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The positions of the groups B and C in the ETS-
process are largely sustained in the 2030 Framework,
where most of them lobby against a distinct RE target,
with the exception of Ørsted, CEDEC, and Eurelectric
(see Table 4). Ørsted’s response contained elements from
the ‘technology development’ logic (see Section 1) ar-
guing that even though a strong ETS is fundamental for
the green transition: “in itself, it is not sufficient to en-
sure volume, industrialization, and cost reductions and
market maturity for next-generation RES technologies
such as offshore wind” (DONG Energy, 2013). Eurelectric
was initially against a separate RE target in their 2030
Framework-response but changed their position during
2014 to accept a modest target.
Whereas the ETS reform is characterized by clear divi-
sions between the actors and rather ‘extreme’ positions,
the CEP-process shows a more modest picture. Figures 3
and 4 show policy preferences as expressed in consul-
tation responses to the CEP and distinguishes between
showing the preference for RE support only (D1.2), and
combining D1.2with the ETS preference (D1.1) into a pol-
icy mix preference (D1).
The main division between the renewable industry
and E-NGOs (groupA) and industry associations (groupC)
is sustained. However, the electricity producers depart
in their preferences for the ETS and RE support and form
two separate policy preference groups: group B and D.
When assessing the policymix preference and not just RE
support, the positions of the two groups B and D become
even more distinct. Group B shows a strong preference
for the ETS and argues that it should be the main driver
for the energy transition in Europe. They propagate full
integration of renewables into themarket and that there
should be no additional RE support or special advantages
formature technologies after 2020. Group D is character-
ized by higher RE ambitions and stronger preferences for
RE support than group B. They also want a strengthening
of the ETS, but many of them question whether this will
be sufficient to ensure continued RE deployment. Some
of them express specific preferences regarding how to
ensure system reconfiguration in order to enable the in-
tegration of more RE into the system. This is a feature
they share with actors in group A. An important differ-
ence between group A and D is that group D actors ex-
press higher confidence in the ETS and its reform.
5.2. Explaining Inconsistencies
The assessment of consultation responses reveals the ac-
tors’ official positions but does not provide much infor-
mation about the motivations and drivers behind them.
The ‘puzzle’ in my sample, i.e., the inconsistent prefer-
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Figure 4. Policy preferences in the Clean Energy Package-process: RE ambition versus instrument mix.
ences across policy processes, is not yet documented or
explored in the literature. Based on institutional theory
literature and seven interviews with six actors from the
respective groups (two in group A, two in group B, two in
group D) and one electricity policy expert, I suggest the
following explanations for the findings: 1) organizational
factors, 2) institutional pressure and 3) reputation and
market strategy. I will start with the first, which I argue is
the most important.
Organizational factors include the characteristics of
an organization, including size, type, internal structures,
ethical values, and business model. For the electricity
producers, their policy preferences vary with their pro-
duction portfolios, which is linked to their economic inter-
ests. The ‘pro-RE’ utilities (group D) have shifted—or are
in the process of shifting—their portfolios away fromcoal
and are increasingly investing in RE. The interviewees (I5,
I6) characterize this as a shift in business strategy and re-
port that most of their investments are now in RE. One
interviewee explains how this has resulted in a shift in
policy preferences regarding the ETS and RE policies:
I would think that our company, ten years ago, maybe
also five years ago, would probably have said that the
ETS should be the main driver in the transformation,
but as we have become increasingly active in building
more and more renewables, I must say, it is not our
position that we should stop with support schemes
because the ETS is now strengthened. (I5)
Their preference for combining the two instruments is
described as a consequence of the current situation in
the market, where it is possible to build RE with no sup-
port at very favorable places, but that “inmost cases, you
still need support” (I5). I6 argues that their overall view
is that ETS should be the main policy, but that they are
“not so rigid and say thatwe do not need other policies as
well”. The companies are optimistic about technology de-
velopment, they believe that RE will become even more
competitive and that onewill be able to deploy it without
a support system in the future.
Group D actors share the view of group A to continue
RE support, but the former is much more ETS-friendly
and market-oriented. They express a strong belief in the
ETS and argue that they want a general policy which ad-
heres tomarket principles (I5, I6). Regarding the inconsis-
tencies in policy preferences, they explain that they pur-
sue a two-track strategy in which they see both policies
as complementary:
We would very much like the energy market to work
and to be able to take investment decisions without
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subsidies. Whether and when it can happen is still un-
clear, but we don’t want to say that it will never hap-
pen since we see that it does happen if certain things
fall into place. (I5)
Interestingly, I6 did not support a distinct RE target be-
cause they argue that there should be a balanced re-
lationship between the GHG target and the RE target,
i.e., you should not increase the RE target without in-
creasing the GHG target too. I6 argues that RE support
should target immature technologies and mentions off-
shore wind, which his company is investing in. He also
points to other issues being more important for further
deployment than support schemes, including grid devel-
opment, balancing measures, and cross-border trade.
The positions of the ‘pro-ETS’ actors in the electricity
industry (group B)who did not change their positions can
also be explained by organizational factors and their busi-
ness models in particular. Two interviewees argue that
for utilities that are not carbon exposed, or even those
whose portfolio is not exclusively coal-based, a higher
carbon price will be profitable (I4, I5). Since the price of
fossil power production sets the price in the wholesale
electricity market most of the time, all power producers
(whose generation is dispatched) will experience higher
prices when the carbon price increases. This is what re-
searchers have called “indirect windfall profits” (Wrake,
Burtraw, Lofgren, & Zetterberg, 2012, p. 15). Confronted
with decreasing wholesale electricity prices, the ETS is
one of the few measures that can actually contribute to
restoring these companies’ revenue stream. This is sup-
ported by the study of Fitch-Roy, who finds that indirect
windfall profits were a motivation for some of the utili-
ties who lobbied for a strengthened ETS in the coalition
‘Friends of the ETS’ in the policy process for the ETS re-
form (Fitch-Roy, 2017, p. 259).
The recent reforms of the ETS were mentioned as
dealing with many of the inconsistencies between the
ETS and RE policies. However, one interviewee argues
that fixing the inconsistencies through MSR and perma-
nent cancellation of allowances was not the reason why
the actors change their policy preferences towards RE
policies. He believes the actorswould have changed their
position regarding RE policies anyway due to their busi-
ness needs and that theywould just have stopped talking
about the inconsistencies (I7).
Institutional pressure is another important part of the
explanation. The interviewees lend particular weight to
the importance of non-market institutional drivers such
as the legal and regulatory framework and recent scien-
tific findings regarding the urgency of climate change but
also highlight market drivers such as consumer demand.
Overall, the binding RE targets in the 2009 RE directive is
characterized as an important driver for RE deployment
in Europe and associated cost-reductions (I1, I3, I4). The
RED as of 2009 amplified the dynamics that had started
with national energy transitions in several front-runner
countries (Cointe & Nadaï, 2018).
Obviously, the change in the political landscape has
affected many companies with many companies now
having set up RE departments when previously they had
none. The whole situation is very different from 2009
when the 2020 package was adopted (I7). If the policy
preferences for RE support reflect the position of the RE
departments, but not necessarily the view of the com-
pany as a whole, this can also be an explanation for the
shift in policy preferences.
The Commission has also shifted their position on RE
support since they announced their strategy to phase
out RE support schemes by 2030 in the State Aid Guide-
lines (Commission, 2014). In the revised RE Directive
(2018/2001) adopted in December 2018, MSs are still al-
lowed to apply support schemes (Art. 4). According to
one market expert, this reflects the broader position of
the Commission,which acknowledges that it is difficult to
build renewables without support and to set a deadline
for when to phase out support schemes. The timing for
ruling out subsidies completely depends on many differ-
ent factors, including country geography, national frame-
work conditions, and the ETS price (I7). This discussion is
illustrative for the debate aboutwhether andwhen these
technologies can be characterized as mature.
Finally, it should be considered whether publicly an-
nounced RE strategies and high RE ambitions belongs to
a market strategy of the companies, in which they em-
ploy selective disclosure or even greenwashing. For in-
stance, RWE expressed quite high RE ambitions, which
is questionable given their strong coal portfolio. How-
ever, shortly after the consultation, RWE split into RWE
and Innogy, the latter promoting itself as a green energy
company, which could have explained the RE preference.
A closer look at Innogy’s strategy reveals that it is primarily
a retail electricity company, with limited, although renew-
able, production capacity (3,9 GW in 2017) (Innogy, 2018).
Another example is Total, who promotes itself as a global
leader within solar energy, and strongly advocates contin-
ued advantages for RE producers in the CEP. Even though
they pursue an ambitious solar strategy, their main busi-
ness is still within oil and gas (TOTAL, 2018).Whether their
solar business is part of a market strategy of the company
as a whole is outside the scope of this article.
Despite the economic interest of utilities in high CO2
prices, interviewees disagree that the ETS is used as a
strategy to prevent RE deployment. However, one of
them acknowledges that some actors have done this in
the pastwhen claiming that the ETS should be the only in-
strument. Hence, one could also assume that those who
were against a RE target would be more critical about RE
support. I6 argues that the reason they did not lobby ac-
tively for a distinct RE target was that they want the GHG
emissions reduction target to play a superior role in the
climate policy framework. They perceive the solution to
be amix of technologies, in which a fuel switch from coal
to gas and nuclear might play a role.
Summing up, what initially appears as inconsis-
tency in policy preferences of many utilities can be
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explained by organizational factors, i.e. endogenously
driven changes in business strategies by these actors,
which has influenced the companies towards divesting
from coal and investing heavily in RE. This trend is highly
related to external drivers, both non-market such as regu-
latory frameworks and policy targets, but alsomarket fac-
tors including consumer demand. Whether or not these
strategies are also part of a market strategy cannot be
judged within the frames of this study, but for those util-
ities still active in fossil fuel and nuclear energy, this pos-
sibility cannot be excluded.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
This article systematically assesses the policy prefer-
ences of five non-governmental groups of actors within
EUelectricity policy across three policy processes. It finds
that for four groups, preferences remain stable across
policy processes. In the ETS reform process, industry
associations, traders, and the electricity industry advo-
cated that the ETS should be the main climate policy in-
strument. In this vein, they mobilize arguments set out
by the economists, i.e., that additional policies are in-
consistent with the ETS. In the 2030 Framework, the
same groups argued almost univocally against a distinct
RE target. This contrasted the positions of E-NGOs and
the RE industry, claiming that the ETS is insufficient to
drive RE deployment and that a mix of several different
instruments is needed to enable the energy transition.
For these actors, the ETS and RE policies were perceived
as consistent and coherent, with many highlighting the
need for a broad portfolio of measures in line with the
arguments of innovation literature. However, in the CEP-
process, several utilities (group D) adopted amiddle posi-
tion between the conventional utilities and RE industry.
They advocated for the continued support of RE along
with the strengthening of the ETS. Several of these ac-
tors lobbied against a distinct RE target in the ETS pro-
cess, but for some reason modified their positions in the
CEP-process. Even though this shows that the policy pref-
erences of these actors are inconsistent across policy pro-
cesses, data from in-depth interviews reveal that the ac-
tors themselves do not perceive their shift in position as
inconsistent or problematic. For them, it ismerely a ques-
tion of which policies better suit their current portfolio
and business strategy.
The positions occupied by this group of ‘pro-RE’ utili-
ties (group D) represent something new in EU energy pol-
icy. Even though their positions approach the positions
of RE associations and E-NGOS (group A), they stand
out as being far more market-oriented and having much
stronger ETS-preferences. Whereas group A questions
whether the ETS will be able to set a proper price signal,
group D believes that the ETS could become a main in-
strument sometime in the future.
For the literature on public policy, the study sheds
light on situations in which shifts in policy preferences of
many key actors can occur within very short time frames.
Such rapid changes among a large number of actors are
not well documented in the literature and deserve fur-
ther attention. The limited scope of this article does not
allow for elaboration regarding the theoretical implica-
tions of the findings, but a fruitful avenue might be to
integrate concepts from the transitions literature into in-
stitutional theory for conceptualizing such dynamics.
For policymakers, it is important to acknowledge that
large electricity industry actors are moving from having
an ‘either-or’ position on climate policy to advocating
that RE support can actually be combined with the ETS.
This is also a question about choosing the correct policy
design elements for the ETS, which succeeded, at least to
some extent, with the MSR and permanent cancellation
of surplus allowances. With the adoption of the revised
ETS-directive, the argument that ‘RE policies destroy the
ETS’ will no longer hold water. Provided with more con-
sistency in the policymix, the call for a rapid phase-out of
RE subsidies might weaken, which might increase accep-
tance for continued RE policies. This is important given
that RE is still a niche technology inmany European coun-
tries, which points to the need for continued support.
Moreover, the findings suggest that the number of pro-
RE actors is growing, which increases momentum for the
energy transition. This is also confirmed by the inter-
views. Policymakers could exploit these developments to
introduce more ambitious policies in line with calls from
science for rapid decarbonization (IPCC, 2018).
For the literature on policy mixes for sustainability
transitions, the analysis shows the need to also study
the interaction between policies from a policy prefer-
ence point of view. It also provides new evidence on the
key role which cap-and-trade systems might take in ad-
vanced transitions. A further contribution to the transi-
tions literature is to show empirically how the energy
transition is entering a stage inwhich several incumbents
define themselves as key actors within RE. As a result,
these actors will also try to pull the transition in a direc-
tion which is favorable for them, into what Lindberg et al.
(2018) have called a ‘low-disruption transitions pathway’.
It remains to see whether this will happen at the cost of
smaller and private RE producers, or whether these two
developments can take place in parallel.
There are several interesting issues for further re-
search. For the transition literature, it would be inter-
esting to study the processes within the firms that have
decided to change their strategies. It is likely that the
discussion about whether and when RE-support should
be abolished takes place also within companies with di-
verse portfolios, who are forced to balance their inter-
ests across these needs. Since the companies want to
speak with one voice publicly, other methods would be
needed to acquire more information about these intra-
organizational tensions.
Another pressing task is to capture the policy pref-
erences of another type of electricity producers which
was clearly underrepresented in this study: the small-
scale producers and prosumers (only represented to
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some extent through the RE associations and CEDEC).
These types of actors have contributed strongly to the en-
ergy transition, but have different needs than the incum-
bents when it comes to support and regulations. Schol-
ars should pay attention to whether the incumbents will
manage to pull the policy mix for the energy transition
in their preferred direction, or whether these small play-
ers can find ways to maintain their role in this unfolding
transition. Further research is needed to analyze the pol-
icy mix preferences for different types of actors, for iden-
tifying coalitions between these types of actors and as-
sessing their influence in the contested EU energy and
climate policy processes.
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Annex
Table A. List of interviewees.
Interviewee Position in organisation Type of organisation Date
Interviewee 1 Policy advisor Eurelectric—umbrella association November, 2017
for European electricity industry
Interviewee 2 Policy advisor Renewable energy association November, 2017
Interviewee 3 Policy advisor Renewable energy association November, 2017
Interviewee 4 Head of Department Utility September, 2018
Interviewee 5 EU Regulatory affairs Utility January, 2019
Interviewee 6 EU Regulatory affairs Utility January, 2019
Interviewee 7 Former Policy Officer EU energy policy expert January, 2019
Table B. Consultations used as data source for this study.
Initiated by Name of consultation Consultation period Abbreviation
DG Climate Consultation on structural options to December 2012 to February 2013 ETS 2013
strengthen the EU Emissions Trading System
DG Energy Consultation on climate and energy policies March 2013 to July 2013 2030 Framework
until 2030
DG Climate Consultation on Emission Trading System (ETS) May 2014 to July 2014 ETS 2014
post-2020 carbon leakage provisions
DG Climate Consultation on revision of the EU Emission December 2014 to March 2015 ETS 2015
Trading System (EU ETS) Directive
DG Energy Consultation on a new Energy Market Design July 2015 to October 2015 EMD
DG Energy Preparation of a new Renewable Energy November 2015 to February 2016 RED
Directive for the period after 2020
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Table C. Policy preference—ranking values for each dimension.
1.1 Lead question: The ETS should be the main instrument for the EU’s energy transition
1.1 - 1 = Yes, the ETS is fundamental and should be the main instrument.
1.1 - 2 = Rather yes, ETS is important. In principle, it should be the main instrument.
1.1 - 3 = Rather no, the ETS is not sufficient. We may need other instruments as well.
1.1 - 4 = No, the ETS is not sufficient to ensure the energy transition and will not be so in foreseeable future.
1.2 Lead question: Should there be support for RE after 2020?
1.2 - 1 = No, RE support should be eliminated
1.2 - 2 = Rather no, but in some cases we may need (strongly) delimited support. Support to ’mature technologies’
should be removed.
1.2 - 3 = Rather yes, we still need some sort of support post 2020
1.2 - 4 = Yes, RE support is inevitable to ensure we reach the 2030 targets. Prefer exemptions from balancing
responsibilities and merit order dispatch.
2.1 Lead question: Do we need to strengthen the ETS? (permanent removal of surplus/include backloaded allowances
in the MSR)? Higher LRF than EC proposal > 2.2%?
2.1 - 1 = No, the ETS is working well and will achieve its objective for 2020 (Or: the cap for 2030 is already too high).
2.1 - 2 = Rather no, there is not much need to strengthen the ETS. Any adjustment should not come before 2020.
2.1 - 3 = Rather yes, we need the MSR and support the suggestion for a tighter LRF (as suggested by EC).
2.1 - 4 = Yes, we need a rapid introduction of the MSR (before 2020)/permanent removal of surplus allowances/a
higher LRF than suggested by the EC (>2,2%).
2.2 Lead question: Should there still be free allowances after 2020 and, if yes, how large should this share of the
post-2020 allowance budget be?
2.2 - 1 = Yes, there should be no limit to free allowances for industry.
2.2 - 2 = Yes, higher or same share of free allowances in phase 4 (post 2020) as in phase 3 (2012–2020).
2.2 - 3 = Yes, lower share in phase 4 than in phase 3/based on efficiency benchmarks that provide incentives for GHG
reductions
2.2 - 4 = No, as a general rule, there should be no free allowances. Only if it can be proved that carbon leakage is a
real issue.
3.1 Lead question: RE deployment is of greatest importance and we need to increase the pace of RE deployment.
3.1 - 1 = No, RE is currently sufficiently deployed (in the EU)
3.1 - 2 = Rather no, we might deploy a bit more in some regions, but no need to speed up deployment
3.1 - 3 = Rather yes, we need to increase RES shares
3.1 - 4 = Yes, we must aim for a renewable energy system and we need to speed up deployment to achieve this
3.2 Lead question: RE is sufficiently (or over-exploited) deployed in the EU
3.2 - 1 = Yes, potential for further RE is very limited.
3.2 - 2 = Rather yes, RE is quite well deployed and further potential is confined, at least in some areas.
3.2 - 3 = Rather no, there is potential for more RE
3.2 - 4 = No, there is a huge potential for much more RE in the EU
3.3 Lead question: We need ambitious RE targets and to make sure we reach these targets.
3.3 - 1 = No, there is no need for ambitious RE targets.
3.3 - 2 = Rather no, RE is developing fine as it is.
3.3 - 3 = Rather yes. We need to make sure that we have some targets for RE.
3.3 - 4 = Yes, we need ambitious (and preferably binding) targets for RE and make sure we reach these targets.
3.4 Lead question: RE deployment is a reason for increased system costs and energy prices
3.4 - 1 = Yes, RE are very expensive and increase the cost of system and consumer prices
3.4 - 2 = Rather yes, RE lead to higher costs.
3.4 - 3 = Rather no, RE are not the main reason why costs increase
3.4 - 4 = No, conventional energy is also expensive and we need to invest in the energy system anyways.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 1, Pages 105–123 121
Table D. Groups of actors and quotes from consultation responses.
Policy GROUP A GROUP D GROUP B GROUP C
preference
group
Actor type E-NGOs, Electricity industry Electricity industry Industry, business
RE associations associations
Quotes
on ETS
(examples)
WWF warns strongly
against a carbon
market ‘orthodoxy’
where the Commission
would perpetuate the
notion that the EU ETS
can deliver all the
needed emission
reductions in a timely
manner on its own. No
single policy
instrument can be left
alone to achieve this
complex and
multi-faceted task
since it cannot correct
all the relevant market
failuresIn particular,
the EU ETS must be
framed as having its
rightful place in an
optimal mix of policy
instruments in the pre
and post 2020 context.
(WWF, ETS, 6.2)
The EU ETS must be
reformed boldly if it is
to be turned into an
effective policy
instrument. Otherwise
it will remain a
toothless paper tiger
that fails to adequately
drive the
decarbonisation of
European industry.
However, the EU ETS
alone will not be able
to deliver the
necessary incentives to
decarbonize the EU.
(E3G, ETS)
The ETS will not force
old, carbon-intensive
plants out of operation
(allowance prices are
too low and will likely
remain too low even
beyond 2030). (CAN,
RED, p. 12)
Ideally RES support
schemes should be
phased out, but this
requires that the ETS
will start to become
relevant as a proper
pricing of CO2 (Dong,
RED, p. 12)
Even though different
drivers (such as CO2
price and market
forces) could ensure
the development of
renewable sources in
the market, a gap
versus the [EU RES]
target could still
remain. (Enel, EMD,
p. 9)
Although carbon
pricing should be the
main driver for
decarbonisation
investments, the
existence of a
quantitative RES target,
together with an ETS
so far incapable of
giving a sound CO2
price signal for
decarbonisation,
points to the need for
continuing RES support
schemes. (Iberdrola
EMD, Executive
Summary p. 1)
The objective should
be that investments in
competitive
technologies are fully
driven by wholesale
and carbon market
signals. To this end the
ETS should become
the main EU
instrument to achieve
the 2030 emission
reduction target.
(Statkraft, NEM, p. 10)
ETS also has to play a
greater role by
delivering a clear
carbon price signal.
(Foratom EMD, main
pos. p. 8)
A clear CO2 price signal
set at a sufficient level
should be the real
driver for investments
to foster the transition
towards a low-carbon
economy, including for
investments in
renewable energy
sources (RES). In this
respect, a reform of
the existing EU ETS
scheme should provide
the right level of
incentives to invest in
low-carbon solutions
in the long term,
considering that
low-carbon
investments are highly
capital intensive
infrastructure
depending from
long-term choices.
(EDF, EMD diff. layout
p. 11)
A successful EU ETS is
important as it
provides clear market
signals for all
low-emission
technologies.
(Euracoal, EMD, p. 8)
The ETS is delivering its
objective for 2020: the
ETS sector will reduce
its CO2 emissions by
21% compared with a
2005 baseline in a
cost-effective and
economically efficient
way. (Euracoal, EMD,
p. 6)
The climate policy in
the electricity
generation sector is
directed by EU ETS
which is aiming at
carbon reductions at
the lowest cost. The
ETS fits into a broader
energy and climate
policy aiming at
guaranteeing secure,
competitive and
sustainable-energy.
(IFIEC, RED, p. 7)
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Table D. (Cont.) Groups of actors and quotes from consultation responses.
Policy GROUP A GROUP D GROUP B GROUP C
preference
group
Actor type E-NGOs, Electricity industry Electricity industry Industry, business
RE associations associations
Quotes on RE
support
(examples)
National support
should continue to be
part of the EU climate
and renewable energy
policy as we move
towards 2030. Steady
and continuous RE
deployment requires
stable and credible
framework conditions
that build on a robust
governance
mechanism. (BEE,
EMD, p. 9)
The national support
schemes adopted by
EU member states
have been
instrumental in the
deployment of
renewable energy in
recent years. They will
continue to play an
important role in
ensuring the required
investments for
reaching the 2030
targets. The RED
review should
maintain provisions
mandating the
adoption of support
schemes. (Greenpeace
RED p. 6)
There will be a
continued need to
ensure Europe can
focus on no-regret
measures [for
decarbonisation] such
as the deployment of
renewable energy and
energy efficiency at
scale, guided by
dedicated targets and
support measures.
(WWF, ETS, 6.2)
All support systems for
electricity from
renewable sources
(RES-E) in line with the
Environmental and
Energy state Aid
Guidelines (EEAG) shall
determine the support
level by competition.
Hence production
targets are a necessity
to determine the
volume (MW typically
for Feed-in Premium
systems with tenders
or MWh for RES quota
systems) beforehand.
(Vattenfall, RES p. 9)
The principle of
priority access and
dispatch enshrined in
the RED should be
maintained after 2020
(Total, RED, p. 30)
Support schemes will
still be needed for RES
technologies under
development, and in
the industrialisation
phase towards costs
that are similar to
expected market
revenues. (Dong, RED,
p. 12)
Support schemes will
probably still be
needed to achieve the
2030 EU targets but
need to evolve
towards more cost
effective competitive
schemes leading to
long term contracts.
(Enel RED, p. 12)
Policies should be
immediately reformed
to make RES fit for
market. This means
applying to RES the
same rights and
obligations of market
participation as other
market participants
(operational
integration of RES).
(Foratom EMD, main
pos. p. 8)
A clear rule should be
that all remaining
subsidies for mature
technologies must be
phased out at the end
of the current subsidy
schemes or at the
latest after 2020 when
the CO2 price should
be the only driver to
steer decarbonisation
and growth or RES”
(Fortum, EMD, p. 11)
Subsidies should be
made available only
where needed.
Market-ready
technologies should
fully participate in the
market while a
functioning CO2
emissions market that
puts a clear price on
externalities will help
them; (Epex, RED,
p. 11)
Heavily subsidising
certain technologies
(i.e. the solar boom
leaves a debt to be
paid by German
consumers over the
next 20 years of €100
to €200 billion) distorts
the energy market so
much that almost all
other energy sources
are at a disadvantage.
(Euracoal, EMD, p. 6)
RES-E support in many
MSs leads to an
uncoordinated impact
into the functioning of
the electricity market
with negative
consequences for
stability and huge
increase of system
costs. (…) Technologies
that cost 200–300
percent more than a
product price should
not be rolled out at the
level of the RES target.
(IFIEC, RED, p. 7–8)
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